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Abstract
This paper examines psycho-induced overconsumption in a dynamic
stochastic context. As emphasized by well-established psychological re-
sults, these psycho-distortions derive from a decision making based on
simple rules-of-thumb, not on analytically sounded optimizations. To
our end we therefore compare two New Keynesian models. The first is
populated by optimizing Muth-rational agents and acts as the normative
benchmark. The other is a ”psycho-perturbed” version of the benchmark
that allows for the potential presence of overoptimism and, hence, of over-
consumption. The parameters of these models are estimated through a
Bayesian-type procedure, and performances are evaluated by employing
an entropy measure. Such methodologies are particularly appropriate here
since they take in full consideration the complexity generated by the ran-
domness of the considered systems. In particular, they let to derive a not
negligible information on the size and on the cyclical properties of the
biases. In line with cognitive psychology suggestions our evidence shows
that the overoptimism/overconsumption is: widespread - it is detected
in nation-wide data; persistent - it emerges in full-sample estimations; it
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moves according to the expected cyclical behavior - larger in booms, and
it disappears in crises. Moreover, by taking into account the effect of these
psycho-biases, the model fits actual data better than the benchmark. All
considered, then, enhancing the existing literature our findings i) sustain
the importance of inserting psychological distortions in macroeconomic
models and ii) underline that system dynamics and psycho biases have
statistically significant and economically important connections.
JEL code: C30, D58, D80.
Keywords: Dynamic stochastic models, Psychological Biases, Business Cycle,
Bayesian Estimation, Entropy.
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1 Introduction
Beyond its purely theoretical content, the field of dynamic stochastic models is
particularly relevant for applications in several scientific contexts. In fact, such
models might be efficiently used to describe the wide set of evolutive phenom-
ena whose dynamics is random. In this respect, economics is one of the most
representative subjects where this class of models plays a role of paramount
importance (see e.g. Vandewalle and Ausloos, 1998; Ausloos and Ivanova, 2002;
Ausloos et al., 2004; Alfarano, et al., 2007; Li and Gao, 2008; Mitchell and
Ackland, 2009 and, more recently, Dhesi and Ausloos, 2016; Dhesi et al., 2016).
In this paper we take advantage of the prominent example of New Key-
nesian theory, which is usually set up as dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE, in the usual economic jargon) models. Such dynamic models are
small-scale settings aimed at formally describing an economic system. DSGE
proponents assume that the system is populated by a representative so-called
Muthian agent which operates subject to budget constraints and technological
restrictions. Specifically, an agent is said to be Muthian if she is able to max-
imize her utility and to form “rational” - i.e. model-consistent - expectations.
Over time these models have become widespread and commonly used because
they are a powerful tool that provide a coherent framework for policy discussion
and economic analysis. In principle, they can help to identify sources of fluctu-
ations, answer questions about structural changes, forecast the effect of policy
changes, etc.
Despite its widespread use, it has long been known that the assumptions
behind standard DSGE models are rather stringent. The rational expectations
(RE) hypothesis is one important instance. In particular, the RE hypothesis
implies that the system can be studied as if a fully-informed optimizing repre-
sentative decision maker operates in it. The robust results achieved in cognitive
psychology - not to mention the simple observation of real -life agents - clearly
lowers the realism of standard DSGE models. Indeed, it is unsurprising these
models still need to prove their ability to fit actual data, especially in extraor-
dinary cyclical phases.
Our intended contribution and aim is to study the complexity of the typi-
cal DSGE model framework when a peculiar kind of perturbation is inserted.
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Specifically, we consider two New Keynesian models. The first, standard, is
populated by fully-informed-optimizing Muth-rational agents and acts as the
normative benchmark. The other allows the agents’ consumption path to be
different from the RE one. Throughout the paper we use the adjective ”over”
exactly to refer to a level of consumption larger than that featuring a Muth-
rational agent. As mentioned, the motivation to do that is based on well-known
results stemming from the theory of heuristics and biases (Kahneman and Tver-
sky 1974). Indeed, cognitive psychology convincingly argues that most agents
use intuitive strategies and simple heuristics such as better-than average effects,
illusion of control, hindsight bias, confirmation bias and the like. These latter
are reasonably effective some of the time, but they also produce biases and give
rise to systematic incongruities that are at odds with statistical reasoning and,
accordingly, with Muth-rationality. To our ends it is important to underline
that these undisputed distortions cannot be derived from ”objective” economic
reasoning neither from mathematical optimization rules. Otherwise stated they
can be seen as drivers of non-analytically based decisions. The rules-of-thumb we
study bear other worth noticing features. They are immanent and widespread,
in that affecting the representative agent supposed to operate in DSGE models.
In addition, the effect of these heuristics on consumption is predictable. First,
the persistent distortion is positive - intuitive reasoning generates overoptimism
and, in turn, overoptimism leads to overconsumption. Second, economic booms
tend to create even more overoptimism than usual. Third, bad economic times
tend to make agents more Muth-rational. All that affords us to perform a well-
established battery of testable hypotheses. The distortion we are interested
in has another nice attribute. Ours is a form of psycho-induced overoptimism
that, ipso facto, is totally disconnected from economic fundamentals. In this
sense we complement the existing macroeconomic literature, which typically ap-
proaches psychological issues in a way that is crucially different from ours. In
the macroeconomic literature, indeed, psychological issues enters the macroe-
conomic models, if any, in a very generic way – virtually all authors study
”confidence” or ”optimism” with no other qualification. By contrast, we exam-
ine peculiar psycho-biases with well-established features and we test whether
these distortions vary during the cyclical phases. As mentioned, this is crucial
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because it affords us to impose the due discipline to our simulations.
To carry out the analysis, we use methodologies of two types: first, in line
with a wide strand of literature (see among others Apte et al., 2007; Canova,
2007; Smets and Wouters, 2007; Farnoosh and Ebrahimi, 2007; Farnoosh and
Morteza, 2009; Hutter et al., 2014), we estimate the parameters of the models
by applying an inferential Bayesian-type procedure, based on a Monte Carlo
Markow Chains (MCMC) algorithm; second, we measure how the performances
of the model fits the real data by applying a concept of entropy. For the use of
entropy in the measurement of the performances in economic contexts, see e.g.
Perazzo et al. (1995), Lorenz and Lohmann (1996), Frigg (2006), Januario et al.
(2009), Salarieh and Alasty (2009), Miskiewicz and Ausloos (2010), Sensoy et al.
(2014), Bartolacci et al., (2015) and the recent and interesting survey of Tang
et al. (2015). The novel approach we propose leads to the assessment of the
actual size of the bias. This represents an advancement also in the economic-
psychology field of research, which rarely gives indications about the size of
these biases. All considered, then, the proposed standpoint could enable us to
reach new and intriguing findings.
Supporting our research strategy, evidence shows that taking into account
a more realistic modus operandi allows an otherwise standard DSGE model to
fit better actual data both in the long-run and in an economic boom scenario.
Recessions are instead characterized by more rational decision making. More
importantly, all these results are in line with our a priori. One can also note
that, to the extent that booms can be seen as ”gains”, our evidence is also
somewhat in line with the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979a).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we deal
with psycho-biases and we give support to the overconfidence/overconsumption
hypothesis. Section 3 describes the theoretical benchmark model. In section 4,
we provides arguments for inserting the overconfidence hypothesis in a standard
DSGE model. In section 5, we describe the empirical data used in our study,
the methodology employed to estimate the parameters and the related results.
In section 6, we analyze the model’s dynamics through the impulse response
functions and we compare the performance of the different model’s specifications
through the measures of entropy. Section 7 closes the paper.
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2 Why Do Individuals Overconsume? A brief
literature review
Muth-rationality has been questioned by very many authors. Just to mention,
the adaptive learning literature (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) argues that in-
dividuals must relentlessly “learn” to be Muth rational. Somewhat closer to
our aim, Agliari, et al. (2015) study a new Keynesian model with heteroge-
neous agents pointing out that their presence leads to several implications on
the dynamic equilibrium properties. Naimzada and Pireddu (2015) examine
the interaction of a Keynesian good market and a stock market with biased
fundamentalists. A belief bias disposes optimistic agents to overestimate and
pessimistic to underestimate the reference value. Their simulations suggest that
if the interaction is destabilizing then the model may generate - and explain -
boom and bust cycles. Alike Gomes (2015), considering a system where indi-
viduals are endowed with distinct sentiments, finds persistent endogenous waves
of optimism and pessimism. In these models, agents’ rationally switch between
optimism and pessimism abandoning a belief if it performs poorly. As it should
be clear, instead, RE models typically rely on the latent assumption that non-
rational agents will not survive a (unspecified) process of evolutionary market
competition. Typically, the economic literature dealing with ‘’non-rational”
agents does not deepen non-rationality. Instead, unsurprisingly, psychologists
such as Kahneman and Tversky (1974) and their numerous followers (Eysenck
and Groome, 2015) have examined in depth psychological distortions. The re-
sults of their research program on heuristics-and-biases have convincingly shown
that most agents use intuitive strategies and simple heuristics such as better-
than-average effects, illusion of control, hindsight bias, confirmation bias and
the like. These latter are reasonably effective some of the time, but they also
produce biases and give rise to systematic incongruities that are at odds with
statistical reasoning and, accordingly, with Muth-rational expectations.
The foregoing offers the motivation to our paper. Indeed, several points
need to be underlined here about these undisputed rules-of-thumb. First, these
rules do not follow – hence they cannot be derived from – ”objective” economic
reasoning neither from mathematical optimization rules. Otherwise stated they
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can be seen as drivers of non-analytically based decisions. Second, they are im-
manent and widespread, in that affecting constantly the representative agent.
Third, these heuristics tend to create positive biases in people’s decision making.
Indeed, it is well-known that most individuals are overconfident about their own
relative abilities, and unreasonably optimistic about their future (Camerer and
Lovallo, 1999; Sharot, 2011). As Kahneman put it: ”The bottom line is that
all the biases in judgment that have been identified [by psychologists] in the
last fifteen years tend to bias decision-making toward the hawkish side”.1 Simi-
larly, Shiller (2000, page 142) has argued that ”Yet some basic tendency towards
overconfidence appears to be a robust human character trait: the bias is defi-
nitely toward overconfidence rather than underconfidence.” Fourth, a number of
intuitive rules contribute to maintain or strengthen overoptimistic beliefs even
in the face of contrary evidence. In fact, these heuristics are seen to hamper
even the learning by doing, reinforcing the persistence of the positive biases.
It is easy to see why the overoptimism stemming from these biases leads to
overconsumption.
“Over” here means a level of consumption greater than that of an optimizing
agent correctly addressing Euler equations.
The fifth point deals with the possible cyclical features of the psychologi-
cal distortions here under scrutiny. So far, indeed, we have argued about the
structural characteristics of the psycho-biases. Yet another crucial feature of
these latter emerges from the following digression. The herd behavior typically
emerging during booms (Farmer, 2013) may diffuse rule-of-thumb behaviors
even among usually less psycho-prone agents (Milani, 2011; De Grauwe, 2012).
Using the famous Mr. Greenspan’s words, ”irrational exuberance” is at work
(see also Shiller, 2000). By the same token, then, one can expect that amid
recessions overconsumption could be lowered because of both objective and psy-
chological reasons. Regarding the former, i) in bad periods the cost of erring
is higher and ii) the cost of information is lower. Think about the strong me-
dia coverage (Curtin, 2003; Doms and Morin, 2004) and the lay agents’ greater
interest towards financial evolutions during economic crises. This is also some-
what in line with the rational inattention literature (Sims, 2003), which suggests
1This quotation is reported in Johnson et al. (2006).
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that people rationally allocate their attention on salient information only - in-
dividuals are less attentive in booms than in bad times. From the psychological
viewpoint, then, the theory of depressive realism argues that depressed peo-
ple tend to be more realistic than “normal” individuals. Alloy and Abramson
(1979) and their numerous followers (for a review, see Abramson et al., 2002)
have argued that non-depressed people are more likely than depressed people to
think that outcomes are contingent on their actions when they are not. They
concluded that as opposed to demoralized persons, whose perceptions are ap-
parently accurate, normal people distort reality in an optimistic fashion. The
point is that the share of sadden individuals obviously increases in economic
turmoil.
On the empirical ”out-of-lab” side, Bovi (2009) reports evidence on the en-
during presence of these biases throughout two decades and across several Eu-
ropean countries. In particular, data confirm that people tend to form system-
atically overoptimistic predictions and that peculiar cyclical features emerge. A
final note refers to the relationships between overoptimism and overconfidence.
Although we are aware of the difference between them2, in our framework we can
consider these terms as equivalent. In fact, results from the existing literature
suggest that overoptimism and overconfidence are positively related such that
they affect in a similar way the bias we are interested in. In particular, Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979a, 1979b) demonstrate that human judgment is generally
optimistic due to overconfidence. Montier (2007) concludes the overoptimism
and overconfidence tend to have the same causes - the illusion of control and
the illusion of knowledge. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) have then argued
that, in a consumption-saving example, consumers are both overconfident and
overoptimistic. Other studies arguing that overconfidence and overoptimism go
hand-in-hand are Koellinger et al. (2007), Abreu and Mendes (2012), Fellner
and Krugel (2012). Baker and Nofsinger (2010) offer a recent survey reinforcing
the point.
It may also be useful here to recall Brunnermeier and Parker’s (2005) ar-
gument on overoptimism. Their conclusions on overoptimism are based on the
2The expectations of optimistic agents are biased toward good outcomes, while overconfi-
dent agents overestimate the precision of the signals that they receive.
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assumption that people maximize average felicity, optimally balancing this ben-
efit of optimism against the costs of worse decision making. Otherwise stated,
they examine distorted expectations while maintaining that agents optimize
knowing the correct mapping from actions to payoffs in different states of the
world. We draw much more deeply from psychology – our agents are overopti-
mist not because it is rationale to do that. Their decisions are biased because
of a number of unavoidable - in a sense genetic - psychological reasons. Just
to mention, the representativeness heuristic and the law of small numbers may
explain the excess sensitivity of stock prices as a result of investors’ overreacting
to (statistically too) short strings of good news (Shleifer, 2000).
To sum up, a number of different biases merges into one single effect that
pushes agents toward a systematic overoptimism/overconsumption – when it
comes to predicting what will happen in the near or in the distant future, we
overestimate the likelihood of positive events, and underestimate the likelihood
of negative events. Moreover, the effect of these several biases on overconsump-
tion is enlarged in positive cyclical phases and tend to shrink in bad times.
Consumers may be more or less aware about that, but the point remains – a
pervasive overoptimism leads individuals to overconsume, especially in objec-
tively rosier stances.
3 The Theoretical Model
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models are built on microeconomic foun-
dations and emphasize the analytically optimal agents’ intertemporal choices.
DSGE models are usually organized in three separate but interrelated blocks
each modeling the behavior of three representative agents, namely the house-
hold, the firm and the policymaker.
The general equilibrium nature of the model captures the interaction between
policy actions and agents’ behavior. The dependence of current choices on fu-
ture uncertain outcomes makes the model dynamic and assigns a central role to
agents’ expectations in the determination of current macroeconomic outcomes.
Therefore, e.g., output and inflation tomorrow, and thus their expectations as of
today, depend on monetary policy tomorrow in the same way as they do today;
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of course, taking into account what will happen from then on into the infinite
future.
The explanation so far refers to the equilibrium aspect of the model. The
stochastic nature of the DSGE model allows out-of-equilibrium realizations.
Every period random exogenous events perturb the equilibrium conditions, in-
jecting uncertainty in the evolution of the economy and thus generating eco-
nomic fluctuations. Without these shocks, the economy would evolve along a
perfectly predictable path, with neither booms nor recessions. Markup shocks,
for example, affect the pricing decisions of the firm that underlies the supply
block, while demand shocks capture changes in the willingness of households to
purchase the goods produced by the firm.
More specifically, ours is a standard three-blocks new-Keynesian closed economy
DSGE model with rational expectations. The demand block captures the repre-
sentative household’s behavior and the government whose public consumption
described by an AR(1) process is entirely financed by lump-sum taxation; the
supply block models the representative firm’s decisions. In the policy block the
key policy variable is the interest rate to reflect the tendency of central banks
to raise the short-term interest rate when the economy is overheating as well
as when inflation rises, and to lower it in the presence of economic slack. By
adjusting the nominal interest rate, monetary policy in turn affects real activ-
ity and through it inflation, and eventually the effect acts on the supply block.
The policy rule therefore closes the circle, giving us a complete model of the
relationship between three key endogenous variables: real output, inflation, and
the nominal interest rate.
Clearly, there are several potential candidates for our goals. However, the se-
lected framework is representative of a larger class of models and it is commonly
used in both macroeconomic practice and literature. Thus, the version we pro-
pose is the result of several validations and refinements. Indeed, our benchmark
model is rich enough to provide a satisfactory empirical account of the evolution
of output, inflation, and interest rate. All considered, then, the chosen model is
a suitable and robust benchmark for our aims.
We are now ready to present more formally the dynamic stochastic model acting
in this paper as benchmark (for more details, see Gal´ı, 2003 and 2008, Smets
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and Wouters, 2003 and Gal`ı and Monacelli, 2008).
Expressing all the variables in log-deviations from their steady state values, we
have:

yt = (1− λ) ct + λgt
y˜t = yt − y¯t
pit = βpiet+1 +
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ mct
mct = wt − at
ct =
(
α
1+α
)
ct−1 + ( 11+α )c
e
t+1 −
(
1−α
1+α
)
(rt − piet+1)
wt =
(
1
1−α
)
ct + γnt −
(
α
1−α
)
ct−1
nt = yt − at
rt = φpipit + φy y˜t
at = ρat−1 + ²at
gt = ϕgt−1 + ²
g
t
(1)
A formal and analytical derivation of each equation of 1 is provided in Appendix.
The subscript t means at time t, yt is current output, y˜t is the output gap, y¯t is
the fully-flexible price output, rt is the nominal interest rate, pit is the inflation
rate, gt is the public expenditure, mct denotes the real marginal cost of firms,
wt are real wages, at is the labor productivity, nt is labor while cet+1 and pi
e
t+1
denote the rational expectation of variable c and pi at time t+1 formed at time
t, respectively. The last two equations determine the stochastic dynamics of the
labor productivity and public expenditure. The stochastic perturbations ²at and
²gt are I.I.D.
To be as clear as possible, we have collected the parameters in (1) - along with
their economic meanings - in Table 1.
4 Nesting Heuristics and Biases in the Bench-
mark DSGE Model
In Section 2, we have outlined the reasons why agents may follow biased - with
respect to Muth optimality - consumption paths. Taking advantage of psychol-
ogists’ hints allows drawing a suitable set of hypotheses that we test in this
paper. Specifically, we argue - and we verify - the enduring presence of bi-
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Table 1: Definition of the model parameters
λ steady state government spending share
α persistence in private consumption
ρ persistence of public expenditure
ϕ persistence of labor productivity
β rate of time preference
θ index of price rigidity
γ intertemporal elasticity of substitution for leisure (Frisch elasticity)
φpi sensitivity of central bankers to inflation
φy sensitivity of central bankers to cyclical stances
ases because psychologists convincingly suggest that people use rules of thumb
with no sign that they learn. Otherwise stated, when psychological stimuli are
taken into account, overconsumption emerges as a persistent feature of agents’
decision making, being a structural trait of the human behavior. In fact, it
can also be conceptualized that the bias reacts to cyclical phases. Again in a
predictable way. It let us to test another two assumptions, offering even more
discipline to our exercises. During goldilocks periods, indeed, the agent can be
even more optimistic than usual, whereas the negative phases of the business
cycle are characterized by more realism. The point is that booms may give rise
to larger and more widespread irrational exuberance whereas crises increase the
cost of erring and lower the cost of information, leading agents to be more at-
tentive/realistic decision makers. Thus, the other two testable features of our
peculiar psycho-biases mentioned before are that i) distortions tend to be larger
in booms and ii) to quickly fade out in recessions.
It is worth noting that our definition of psycho-bias is very inclusive without
being vague. Indeed, all the psycho distortions stemming from the theory of
heuristics and biases point to the same direction - namely, overconsumption.
This is a nice feature of these errors because the impact of one or few psycho-
induced bias may remain unobserved in the aggregate, whereas the combined
effect of several rule-of-thumbs all creating overoptimism/overconfidence may
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have significant system-wide effects. Thus, the overconsumption that we are
searching may be driven by all the systematic psycho-driven decision making
that explains that part of the business cycle which is typically left unexplained
by mainstream rational expectations DSGE models.
In order to introduce the agents’ overconsumption into the rational expectations
model in (1), this latter needs to be rearranged. One simple and effective way
to do so is to add to the standard consumption function an element allowing
households to follow both Muth-rational and biased behaviors. More formally,
the psycho-biased augmented (PBA) new-Keynesian model we refer to is equal
to (1), but for the fact that in the Euler equation modeling the private con-
sumption, ct, we insert another expected component:
• Rational expectations (RE) - benchmark: Model (1) with
ct =
(
α
1 + α
)
ct−1 + (
1
1 + α
)cet+1 −
(
1− α
1 + α
)
(rt − piet+1)
• Psychological biases (PBA): Model (1) with δ > 0
ct =
(
α
1 + α
)
ct−1 + (
1
1 + α
)cet+1 + δ
∣∣cet+1∣∣− (1− α1 + α
)
(rt − piet+1)
It should be clear that the rationale for inserting this new element derives
from the previous discussion about the representative individual tendency to-
ward overconsumption. Here it must be stressed that, unlike the benchmark
model, in the PBA one the Euler equation for consumption is not obtained
from “objective” optimization rules. In fact, it cannot be derived from math-
ematical tools almost by definition. The psycho-bias we want to study derives
from mental subjective rules-of-thumb which are just at odds with objective
reasoning. There are another two reasons to insert the ”psycho-perturbing”
component to an otherwise optimum path. Firstly, in this way we have an ob-
jective benchmark, based on mathematical logic (cf. Appendix) to perturb with
subjective, i.e. non analytically–based, decisions. Secondly, the psychological
literature we refer to argues that amid recessions the subjective part of the de-
cision making tend to disappear. Or, equivalently, the objective part tend to
re-emerge. Hence, all we need is a psychological perturbation and an objec-
tive benchmark from which to depart and to which to return according to the
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cyclical phase. The reason why we use the modulus of the expected consump-
tion times delta runs as follows. The behavioral effect must be a non-negative
quantity. As δ > 0, the use of the modulus ensures to obtain positive values,
i.e. overconsumption. Note that the term δ captures the psycho-bias, whereas
the whole term δ|cet+1| aims to capture overconsumption. Thus, the proposed
change in the Euler equation allows quantifying both quantities, which are our
main empirical objects. We argue then that δ should interact with the expected
consumption because, as recalled, there is an important cyclical component in
overoptimism that we want to test. Putting the term δ as a simple drift in con-
sumption path seems to be insufficient to catch the full effect of overoptimism
on overconsumption, which indeed should depend on the level of cet+1. Last but
not least, note that the PBA model generalizes the RE one - by construction
when δ = 0 they are equal.
All considered, then, by letting the data speak within a Bayesian framework
(cf. Section 5) we can obtain robust evidence on the size of our parameter of
interest.
Given our goal, we examine the two models under three different scenarios:
1. whole sample (the ”long run”);
2. subsample of economic boom. It is worth recalling that a boom is defined
as a time period characterized by positive cyclical output growth, i.e. with
∆ lnYt > 0;
3. subsample of economic recessions, i.e.: quarters with ∆ lnYt < 0.
The first exercise allows gathering information on the size of the structural
overconsumption, the other two exercises aim at shedding some light on the
cyclical behavior of the overconsumption. Altogether they provide a suitable
framework to test our hypotheses and the necessary information to address our
research goals.
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5 Dataset, methodology and results of the Bayesian
estimation procedure
The inferential methodology adopted to estimate the model parameters, to sim-
ulate and analyze the dynamic behavior of the relevant variables is based on
Monte Carlo Markow Chains (MCMC) algorithm, that belongs to the family
of Bayesian estimation. We build a multi-chain MCMC procedure based on
4 chains of size 100,000; the algorithm converges within 55,000 iterations to
its correct expected value, and, according to these results, we discard the first
55,000 draws from each chain to remove any dependence from the initial condi-
tions.
In detail, our estimation procedure is based on two steps. In the first step, we
estimate the mode of the posterior distribution by maximizing the log posterior
density function, which is a combination of the prior information on the struc-
tural parameters with the likelihood of the data. In the second step, we use
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in order to draw a complete picture of the
posterior distribution and compute the log marginal likelihood of the model.
The convergence diagnostic is based on Brooks and Gelman (1998) method.
All of the model computations have been performed using Dynare3. Below,
we summarize the measurement equations considered, i.e. the relationships be-
tween the model variables (on the right side) and the data (on the left side): ∆ lnPt
∆lnYt
 =
 pi
η
+ 100 ∗
 pit
yt − yt−1
 (2)
where Pt is the personal consumption expenditures’ price index, Yt is the
real GDP, ∆ lnPt = 100 (lnPt − lnPt−1), ∆ lnYt = 100 (lnYt − lnYt−1), η =
100 (η − 1), pi = 100 (Π∗ − 1) , where η is the real GDP quarterly trend growth
rate and Π∗ is the quarterly steady-state inflation rate. The dataset consists
of quarterly data for real GDP and personal consumption expenditures’ price
index referring to the US from 1959q2:2014q1. The source of the data is Federal
Reserve Economic Data.
Following the logic of this paper, we have used standard values and distributions
3Dynare is a software that is freely available from the website http://www.dynare.org and
has the ability to simulate and estimate economic models
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(see Table 2) for the prior densities of the parameters of the system (1) as
suggested by the literature. In particular, we have adopted the mean values, the
standard deviations and distributions reported in Smets and Wouters (2007) for
the parameters related to the utility function and monetary policy, whereas we
have followed real business cycle literature (King and Rebelo, 1999) and Smets
and Wouters (2003) for the high persistence in labor productivity and public
expenditure. The prior mean value for the steady state government spending
share is the average ratio between US real public expenditure and real GDP
from 1959q2:2014q1.
In Table 2 we compare prior and posterior distributions of the parameters in
the absence of psycho-bias, i.e. δ = 0.
Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters:
the benchmark case
Parameter Prior distribution Post. distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean Conf. Interval 95% St.Dev.
α
β
γ
φpi
φy
ρ
ϕ
λ
pi
η
θ
σ²a
σ²g
beta 0.75 0.05
beta 0.90 0.10
gamma 2.00 0.75
normal 1.50 0.25
normal 0.125 0.05
beta 0.975 0.10
beta 0.90 0.05
beta 0.26 0.05
gamma 0.83 0.10
normal 0.76 0.10
beta 0.75 0.10
inv.gamma 0.10 2.00
inv.gamma 0.10 2.00
0.77 0.77 [0.7636 0.7689] 0.01
0.88 0.88 [0.8763 0.8806] 0.008
2.04 2.03 [1.9987 2.0559] 0.15
1.47 1.47 [1.4586 1.4866] 0.04
0.00 0.005 [0.0028 0.0077] 0.02
1.00 0.999 [0.9971 1.0000] 0.01
0.97 0.973 [0.9723 0.9738] 0.006
0.22 0.22 [0.2121 0.2273] 0.04
0.68 0.83 [0.6716 0.6836] 0.01
0.77 0.78 [0.7749 0.7792] 0.02
0.83 0.83 [0.8222 0.8327] 0.02
0.02 0.02 [0.0176 0.0189] 0.001
0.04 0.04 [0.0359 0.0381] 0.005
The posterior values are substantially in line with the prior ones except for
the sensitivity of Central Bank to the output gap, that exhibits a strong negative
shift, and the index of price rigidity that has a positive shift.
The log-marginal value of the likelihood in this standard case, computed by
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Laplace approximation is -460.38.
In Table 3, we show prior and posterior distributions of the parameters in the
presence of psycho-bias. In this case, the Euler equation of (1) reads as
ct =
(
α
1 + α
)
ct−1 + (
1
1 + α
)cet+1 + δ
∣∣cet+1∣∣− (1− α1 + α
)
(rt − piet+1)
The prior distribution of the psycho-bias, δ, is assumed to be a gamma
with a mean close to zero and unitary standard error. This choice is driven by
the overconsumption hypothesis, implying positive values of δ; the almost zero-
mean4 hypothesis allows us to collapse the psycho-bias case to the benchmark
one in expected value. Finally, the chosen value of the standard error does not
bind the posterior value of δ in a narrow range.
Table 3: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters:
the psycho-bias case
Parameter Prior distribution Post. distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean Conf. Interval 95% St.Dev.
α
β
γ
δ
φpi
φy
ρ
ϕ
λ
pi
η
θ
σ²a
σ²g
beta 0.75 0.05
beta 0.90 0.10
gamma 2.00 0.75
gamma 0.01 1.00
normal 1.50 0.25
normal 0.125 0.05
beta 0.975 0.10
beta 0.90 0.05
beta 0.26 0.05
gamma 0.83 0.10
normal 0.76 0.10
beta 0.75 0.10
inv.gamma 0.10 2.50
inv.gamma 0.10 2.40
0.85 0.86 [0.8310 0.8735] 0.01
1.00 0.97 [0.9458 1.0000] 0.04
2.04 2.03 [1.8591 2.1629] 0.06
0.33 0.32 [0.0100 0.5855] 0.09
1.39 1.38 [1.2856 1.4718] 0.04
0.00 0.0029 [0.0000 0.0063] 0.01
1.00 0.999 [0.9957 1.0000] 0.02
0.96 0.96 [0.9498 0.9679] 0.005
0.28 0.28 [0.2443 0.3067] 0.01
0.80 0.81 [0.7383 0.8724] 0.02
0.76 0.71 [0.6382 0.7778] 0.02
0.89 0.89 [0.8816 0.8972] 0.005
0.03 0.03 [0.0218 0.0316] 0.005
0.03 0.03 [0.0255 0.0325] 0.002
The log-marginal value of the likelihood for this case is -417.74. In order to
4Gamma distribution is not defined for a mean equal to 0, hence we choose a value very
close to but greater than zero (0.01).
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compare this scenario (δ) with the benchmark case (b) we build the Bayes factor
through the Laplace method to approximate the integrated likelihood (Kass and
Raftery, 1995 and Lewis and Raftery, 1997), that is:
Bδ,b = 2 ln
[
f (Y|MPBA)
f (Y|MRE)
]
(3)
where
f (Y|Mm) =
∫
f (Y|θm,Mm) f (θm|Mm) dθm m = PBA,RE (4)
with MPBA and MRE indicating respectively the PBA model and RE model.
The Bayes factor is equal to 85.28, that supports decisively the specification
including the psycho-bias parameter. Hence, the PBA model is able to better
capture the stylized facts concerning the business cycle.
The posterior value for δ is significantly different from zero, thus confirming
the empirical validity of the psycho-bias hypothesis in the Euler equation.
An intriguing result is that there is a positive shift both in the intertemporal
discount factor, β, and in the consumption persistence parameter, α. It means
that the psycho bias term is robust in the sense its statistical significance remains
despite the presence of other subjective variables, It also implies that taking into
account of overconsumption emphasises the presence of greater preference for
the future (a higher value of β) and stronger habit formation in consumption (a
higher value of α). Though here less important, the remaining posterior values
of the parameters are in line with the benchmark case.
In Table 4, we collect prior and posterior distributions of the parameters for
the subsample of economic boom.
To our goal, the most important outcome is that the psycho-bias parameter
is still significantly different from zero and, even more importantly, that it is
greater than in the ”long run” case. Another worth noticing result is that the
Bayes factor (equal to 60.92) continue to corroborate the goodness of our PBA
model with respect to the RE one.
Finally, Table 5 deals with the subsample of economic recessions.
The posterior value of the mode of δ in this case is not statistically different
from zero, correctly rejecting the PBA model. Once again, indeed, this result
is coherent with our a priori: in bad times people tend to - and have reasons to
- perform more objective decision making.
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Table 4: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters:
the psycho-bias case with boom
Parameter Prior distribution Post. distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean Conf. Interval 95% St. Dev.
α
β
γ
δ
φpi
φy
ρ
ϕ
λ
pi
η
θ
σ²a
σ²g
beta 0.75 0.05
beta 0.90 0.10
gamma 2.00 0.75
gamma 0.01 1.00
normal 1.50 0.25
normal 0.125 0.05
beta 0.975 0.10
beta 0.90 0.05
beta 0.26 0.05
gamma 0.83 0.10
normal 0.79 0.10
beta 0.98 0.10
inv.gamma 0.10 3.60
inv.gamma 0.10 2.30
0.72 0.75 [0.6927 0.8133] 0.003
1.00 0.91 [0.7677 1.0000] 0.008
1.96 1.73 [1.0996 2.5422] 0.08
3.77 2.64 [0.0100 5.0156] 0.13
1.48 1.30 [1.0865 1.5993] 0.01
0.02 0.01 [0.0000 0.0131] 0.001
0.79 0.85 [0.7689 0.9217] 0.005
0.96 0.97 [0.9495 0.9809] 0.004
0.34 0.21 [0.1225 0.3012] 0.005
0.77 0.71 [0.6311 0.7862] 0.01
0.61 0.70 [0.5359 0.8289] 0.009
0.83 0.84 [0.7943 0.8975] 0.004
0.02 0.04 [0.0219 0.0617] 0.001
0.02 0.03 [0.0182 0.0427] 0.002
The fact that in recessionary periods overconsumption fades out, and rationality
takes over is confirmed by the Bayes factor (equal to -222.35) - it strongly
supports the model describing Muth-rational agents.
6 Analysis of the performances
6.1 Comparing the models via Impulse Response Func-
tions
In this section we offer i) a preliminary look at the effects on some key macroeco-
nomic variables when a shock hits systems with and without potential overcon-
sumption, and ii) some tentative explanations of the mentioned effects. To learn
about how shocks propagate in our two competing systems we exploit a descrip-
tive tool which is typical in the DSGE literature – namely the impulse response
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Table 5: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters:
the psycho-bias case with recession
Parameter Prior distribution Post. distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean Conf. Interval 95% St. Dev.
α
β
γ
δ
φpi
φy
ρ
ϕ
λ
pi
η
θ
σ²a
σ²g
beta 0.75 0.05
beta 0.90 0.10
gamma 2.00 0.75
gamma 0.01 1.00
normal 1.50 0.25
normal 0.125 0.05
beta 0.975 0.10
beta 0.90 0.05
beta 0.26 0.05
gamma 1.13 0.10
normal -0.76 0.10
beta 0.75 0.10
inv.gamma 0.10 2.80
inv.gamma 0.10 0.95
0.76 0.77 [0.7650 0.7793] 0.004
0.89 0.89 [0.8775 0.9030] 0.001
2.11 2.12 [2.0063 2.3038] 0.001
0.00 0.0058 [0.0000 0.0178] 0.03
1.54 1.52 [1.4856 1.5817] 0.006
0.14 0.13 [0.1230 0.1500] 0.003
0.96 0.94 [0.9355 0.9510] 0.004
0.90 0.90 [0.8964 0.9090] 0.002
0.26 0.25 [0.2439 0.2677] 0.002
1.15 1.16 [1.1523 1.1702] 0.003
-0.73 -0.71 [-0.7338 -0.6943] 0.006
0.73 0.72 [0.7012 0.7352] 0.004
0.03 0.02 [0.0176 0.0281] 0.003
0.05 0.04 [0.0331 0.0524] 0.006
function (IRF). In fact, impulse response functions trace out the response of
current and future values of each of the variables to a one-unit increase (or to
a one-standard deviation increase) in the current value of one of the system er-
rors, assuming that this error returns to zero in subsequent periods and that all
other errors are equal to zero. IRFs summarize model’s dynamic properties and,
in fact, they are also called dynamic multipliers. In this section we report the
IRFs referring to two alternative temporary shocks, one on labor productivity
(cf. Fig. 1, with dashed lines referring to the RE model and solid lines to PBA
model), the other on public expenditure (cf. Fig. 2, with dashed lines referring
to the RE model and solid lines to PBA model). It bears information on the
dynamic behavior of the two models. The variables are expressed in logs, thus
the measures of the responses can be read as elasticities 5. In order to highlight
5The variables responses relate to the posterior values of the parameters and are computed
as the dynamic behavior due to a positive shock of size 1%, that is the measure of its standard
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the comparison between our two models, in the following figures we plot the
IRFs of both models when they are hit by the same (in both qualitative and
quantitative terms) shock.
We show only the IRFs for full sample simulations because the IRFs for the
two DSGE models under scrutiny are virtually equal for most variables when
computed for the subsample characterized by booms and recessions6. From the
full-sample exercises some facts become apparent. Looking at the two figures as
a whole, two common features are that i) the IRFs are qualitatively similar, and
that ii) in the long run the two models tend to return to the pre-shock levels.
This said, as seen, inserting the psycho-bias term into the otherwise standard
model leads to different values of the estimated parameters and, consequently,
produce several quantitative differences. In fact, examining separately the ef-
fects of supply and demand shock on the two models reveals more details.
When the standard DSGE model is hit by a positive shock to labor produc-
tivity, it shows a proportional boost in actual output and a larger expansion
in potential output. The latter - which refers to the fully flexible price equilib-
rium - advances more because of price stickiness (Calvo, 1983). In fact, price
stickiness implies that only a fraction of producers lowers the prices following a
positive supply shock. In turn, this hampers the growth of private consumption
and actual output with respect to the potential one. Accordingly, the output
gap (that in this particular case coincides with the employment) as well as the
short term nominal interest rate shrinks. The rise in labor productivity and
the following fall of labor demand also creates a contraction in real wages. In
fact, as the literature has widely shown (Christiano et al. 1992 and Gal`ı, 1999,
among the others), price rigidity hampers actual output to increase in the same
proportion of the technology shock. Hence, an employment reduction occurs.
Turning the attention to the PBA model, the supply shock scenario points
out visible divergence in some variables. In particular, greater productivity now
reduces labor demand even more with respect to the standard case. Given the
very limited difference between the two models, the logic behind that is always
the same: price stickiness. Then, noting that the inflation rate is shocked in
a similar way, the smaller employment level leads to a much larger real wage
deviation.
6These unreported results are available upon request.
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cuts in the PBA model. In spite of this, private consumption does not shrink
proportionally - the psycho-induced overconsumption prevents an even larger
contraction.
FIG. 1 ABOUT HERE; CAPTION [Impulse response functions for an or-
thogonalized 1% shock on labor productivity]
When a positive shock in public expenditure hits the demand-side of the
system, private consumption could decrease due to a crowding out effect. Again
because of the price rigidity, yet, this latter does not show up. The logic runs
as follows. The positive growth of the actual output stemming from the shock
generates an increase in employment, real wages and real marginal costs. These
latter cause a rise in the inflation rate, but the presence of price stickiness reduces
the impact of real marginal costs on inflation, thus generating a smaller rise,
with respect to the fully flexible price scenario, in the inflation rate. Therefore,
the growth of the nominal interest rate resulting from the greater inflation is
lower than in the absence of price stickiness. Accordingly, price stickiness limits
the crowding out effect, and the output gap increases. Comparing the two
models, the case of the demand shock generates - if any - very small divergences
in the dynamics (note the scale). However, there is a worth noting difference in
the timing. In the first 60 periods after the shock, PBA private consumption
is a bit greater than the standard case. This must be compared with the real
wage IRFs, whereas the PBA case presents a higher IRF for just 50 periods.
That is to say, again, in good times (output is always positive) heuristics seem
to sustain consumption levels over and above objective situations.
FIG. 2 ABOUT HERE; CAPTION [Impulse response functions for an or-
thogonalized 1% shock on public expenditure]
So far we have contrasted the relative dynamics of the two models. In the
next section we perform another kind of comparison in order to see how much
the two models are close to real data. Practically, we examine our two models
via an entropy measure that aims to rank our two competing models w.r.t. their
ability to fit the statistical features of actual data. This is important in general,
but in our setting is even more essential. In fact, this exercise allows supporting
the relative realism of the complex systems under scrutiny and, hence, that of
the stories they can tell.
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6.2 Entropy and comparison of the models
The comparison between the models is performed through measures of entropy.
The idea is to measure how the models involved in the “race” fit actual data,
analysing the distance between actual data of private consumption, and those
stemming from simulating the two competitors. These measures are particularly
appropriate for our purposes because they involve the entire empirical distribu-
tion of the data under scrutiny. Thus our measure encompasses all information
provided by statistics like mean, variance, skewness, kurtosis, autocorrelations
at different lags, and so on. This is different with respect to what typically done
in the macroeconomic literature where the fitness of DSGE models is based on
less general tools such as impulse response functions, standard deviations and
correlations. The simulated time series for the RE and PBA models are gen-
erated through the MCMC method over the 223 quarters represented in the
sample 1959q2:2014q1. For each quarter, we draw 100,000 realizations of the
stochastic shocks described and identified in Section 4. Next, we take the ex-
pected value of this sequence as the corresponding value for each quarter7. The
peculiar measure of entropy we use can be briefly described as follows. If we
consider a generic sample of real numbers {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, with N ∈ N, the
entropy is given by:
E =
N∑
k=1
|xk|∑N
j=1 |xj |
· log
(
|xk|∑N
j=1 |xj |
)
(5)
Armed with this definition, we compute the reference entropies, i.e. those re-
lated to actual data. We denote Ex the reference entropy for the variable x, with
x = y, c, pi. Then, we calculate the entropies of the simulated series, for both the
RE and the PBA model, as coming out from the estimation of the parameter
δ. We denote them as EREx (rational expectations) and EPBAx (psychological
biases).
The macroeconomic variables under investigation are viewed as elements of a
thermodynamic system, in accord to the Econophysics literature (see the In-
troduction for some relevant contributions). The model fitting better with the
actual data is that whose disorder is closer to the one of the reference sample.
Therefore, the absolute value of the difference between the entropies referring
7Hence, our estimate for each quarter is the average of all the trajectories obtained.
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to actual variables x and those referring to the RE model for x represents our
three benchmark distances:
dREx = |EREx − Ex| (6)
Similarly, we measure the distances between the entropy related to x in the
cases of the PBA model and those related to actual data:
dδx = |EPBAx − Ex| (7)
As it should be clear, the PBA model dominates the RE one at the level of
variable x if and only if
Dδ,REx = d
δ
x − dREx < 0
The evaluation of the performance through entropies has been implemented for
the whole sample of data, for the subsamples of boom and recession.
Table 6 collects the findings, whereas in Table 7 we report the differences in (6)
and (7).
Real data Consumption Inflation Output
ENTIRE SAMPLE -5.22 -5.18 -5.20
SUB-SAMPLE OF BOOM -5.10 -5.05 -5.07
SUB-SAMPLE OF RECESSION -3.12 -3.15 -3.09
RE model Consumption Inflation Output
ENTIRE SAMPLE -5.14 -5.15 -5.10
SUB-SAMPLE OF BOOM -4.55 -4.44 -4.46
SUB-SAMPLE OF RECESSION -4.48 -4.46 -4.56
PBA model Consumption Inflation Output
ENTIRE SAMPLE -5.15 -5.08 -5.13
SUB-SAMPLE OF BOOM -4.54 -4.56 -4.49
SUB-SAMPLE OF RECESSION -4.43 -4.45 -0.01
Table 6: Entropies for private consumption, inflation and output for the three
scenarios considered.
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RE model Consumption Inflation Output
ENTIRE SAMPLE 0.08 0.03 0.10
SUB-SAMPLE OF BOOM 0.55 0.61 0.61
SUB-SAMPLE OF RECESSION 1.36 1.31 1.47
PBA model Consumption Inflation Output
ENTIRE SAMPLE 0.07 0.10 0.07
SUB-SAMPLE OF BOOM 0.56 0.49 0.58
SUB-SAMPLE OF RECESSION 1.31 1.30 3.08
Table 7: Differences between entropies in the RE and PBA cases and the bench-
mark case. Computations are obtained by using formulas (6) and (7) and the
values reported in Table 6.
The comparison between the values of the entropy measures shows that for
the whole sample, PBA model dominates the RE one for consumption and out-
put data with a percentage relative improvement respectively of 12.5% and 30%.
In the sub-sample of boom, the PBA model has a relatively better performance
than the RE one for inflation and output with a percentage relative improve-
ment respectively of almost 20% and 5%.
Finally, in the case of recession the slight betterment for consumption (3.7%)
and inflation (0.8%) of the PBA model compared with RE one is accompanied
by a strong worsening for the output of more than 110%.
This evidence confirms the results of the Bayesian estimation process, stating
that in a recessive phase of the business cycle individuals are less, if any, prone to
overconfidence. In particular, entropies suggest that the disorder of the complex
macroeconomic system - with a specific reference to the output gap - is ampli-
fied by the addition of the overoptimism term in the new Keynesian model.
Differently, in the period of boom, PBA model seems to generally fit the actual
data better (or, at least, in a similar way) than the RE one.
Basically, individuals should act as Muthians in bad times, and the overopti-
mism leading to overconsumption is a specific feature of periods of boom. All
in all, the predominance - in terms of explanatory power - of the PBA model on
the RE one is debatable, but the way such models describe the real data could
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be well appreciated only by looking at the considered business cycle.
To conclude, it is important to notice that the obtained outcomes allow us
to claim the presence of a link between psycho-biases in consumption and the
business cycle, even at the level of the single macroeconomic variables.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we elaborate on a new Keynesian DSGE model to support the-
oretical and empirical evidences on overconsumption. In fact, there are many
reasons to believe that real life consumers do not behave as the agent popu-
lating standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. In particular,
main street individuals are likely to overconsume, in the sense that they follow
consumptions path higher than those of optimizing Muth-agents. This leads
to think that DSGE models should allow a much larger degree of freedom in
agents’ decision making.
Two systems are simulated and analyzed through a Bayesian estimation pro-
cedure and compared by adopting an entropy approach. Such methodological
tools are usually employed in the theory of complex systems, and are particu-
larly appropriate in the context we deal with given the complexity generated by
the randomness of the considered models. The benchmark system is tailored on
Muth-rational consumers, while the other one includes that agents are allowed
- but not obliged - to overconsume with respect to the Muthian one. Our per-
spective offers the possibility to quantify the actual size of the biases – as well
as of their effects on consumption - and to lead to a better fit to the empirical
data. In this respect, the Federal Reserve provides official time series related
to the quantities of interest. The sample has been explored as a whole and
also by taking into account specific subsamples of the business cycle featured
by different cyclical phases.
In fact, the size of the overoptimism under scrutiny is likely to show cyclical
features. This is so because we refer to very specific psychological distortions
that bear more information than the simple and general term “confidence” typ-
ically used in the existing literature.
Evidence shows that taking into account the biases stemming from heuris-
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tics allows the DSGE model to fit better actual data. Also, results point out
that overconsumption is a structural trait and that booms turn out to enlarge
significantly the magnitude of the bias. In bad times, instead, agents show a
tendency to be more optimizing/attentive decision makers.
All these empirical outcomes support our research assumptions and enrich
both the economic and psychological literature. All in all, they imply i) that
the business cycle has a non-trivial psychological content, and ii) that decision
making is biased by macroeconomic evolutions in a predictable way.
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Appendix
The Analytical Derivation of the Baseline Theoretical Model
Households
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative household with
preferences defined over current private consumption, Ct, relative to a constant
proportion (α) to the aggregate past consumption (Smets and Wouters, 2003),
Ct−1, public consumption, Gt and labor services, Nt, aimed at maximizing the
expected discounted value of an intertemporal utility function, i.e.:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUt ((Ct − αCt−1) , Gt, Nt) (8)
with βt corresponding to the subjective discount factor, under the following
intertemporal budget constraint:
PtCt + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} ≤ Dt +WtNt + Tt (9)
where Dt+1 is the nominal in t+1 payoff for a generic financial activity held
at the end of period t, Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period
ahead nominal payoffs, Pt is the consumer price index, Wt are nominal wages
and Tt indicates lump-sum taxation that entirely finances government spending
Gt.
In particular Ct is defined as follows
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct (i)
1− 1ε di
] ε
ε−1
(10)
with i representing the variety of goods produced by each firm acting as a
monopolistic competitor, Ct (i) is the consumption of the good i and ε indicating
the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods.
The optimal allocation of expenditures across the households reads as
Ct (i) =
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ε
Ct (11)
with Pt (i) representing the price of the good i and implying that∫ 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i) di = PtCt (12)
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and
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt (i)
1−ε
di
] 1
1−ε
The period utility function assumes the following semi-logarithmic form:
U ((Ct − αCt−1) , Gt, Nt) = (1− ζ) log (Ct − αCt−1) + ζ logGt − N
1+γ
t
1 + γ
(13)
where ζ is the share of public consumption in the utility function.
The problem is solved by using the method of Lagrange multipliers8, i.e.:
L = max
[Ct,Nt,Dt+1]
∞
t=0
E

∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(1− ζ) log (Ct − αCt−1) + ζ logGt − N
1+γ
t
1+γ
)
+
+χt (Dt +WtNt + Tt − PtCt − Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1})

(14)
where χt is the dynamic Lagrange multiplier, with the following three nec-
essary conditions:
∂L
∂Ct
:
(1− ζ)
(Ct − αCt−1)Pt = χt (15)
∂L
∂Nt
:
Nγt
Wt
= χt (16)
∂L
∂Dt+1
: Et {Qt,t+1}χt = βEtχt+1 ⇒ χt = βEt
Et {Qt,t+1}χt+1 (17)
where (17) states that in equilibrium the value of marginal utility of consump-
tion at time t is equal to the discounted expected value of marginal utility of
consumption at time t+ 1.
The following equation is a result of the combination of (15) and (16), i.e.:
Nγt (Ct − αCt−1) =
Wt
Pt
(1− ζ) (18)
Equation (18) can be re-written in its steady state version, where the upper-
bar superscript on a variable indicates the steady state value:
C¯N¯ P¯
W¯ (1− ζ) − α
C¯N¯P¯
W¯ (1− ζ) = 1 (19)
Now, using the following first-order approximation:
XtYt ' X¯Y¯ (1 + xˆt + yˆt) (20)
8The use of dynamic programming technique would produce the same results.
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where xˆt = xt − x¯ and yˆt = yt − y¯ indicate the log-deviation of the variable
from its steasy state value, equation (18) can be similarly log-linearized around
the steady state:
C¯N¯γP¯
W¯ (1− ζ) (1 + cˆt + γnˆt + pˆt − wˆt)− α
C¯N¯P¯
W¯ (1− ζ) (1 + cˆt−1 + γnˆt + pˆt − wˆt) = 1
cˆt + γnˆt + pˆt − wˆt − αcˆt−1 − αγnˆt − αpˆt + αwˆt = 0(
1
1− α
)
cˆt + γnˆt −
(
α
1− α
)
cˆt−1 + pˆt = wˆt
The last expression states that a positive increase in real wages9 (wˆt − pˆt)
determines a positive growth of consumption cˆt and labor supply nˆt. Never-
theless, the presence of habit formation in consumption (α > 0) generates an
adjustment cost in consumption, thus weakening the increase in consumption
when real wages raise.
The combination of (15) and (17) reads as:
βRtEt
[(
Ct − αCt−1
Ct+1 − αCt
)(
Pt
Pt+1
)]
= 1 (21)
where Rt = 1Et{Qt,t+1} is the gross nominal interest rate.
Following the same procedure of (18), (21) can be conveniently log-linearized
around the steady state, which states that
R¯ =
1
β
(22)
The log-linearization of (21) reads as:
1
R¯β
 1 + cˆet+1 + pˆet+1 − α (cˆt + pˆet+1)− cˆt − pˆt − rt+
α (cˆt−1 + pˆt + rt)
 = 1 (23)
α
1 + α
cˆt−1 + (
1
1 + α
)cˆet+1 −
(
1− α
1 + α
)
(rt − pˆiet+1) = cˆt (24)
with piet+1 = p
e
t+1 − pt. This is the log-linearized form of the Eurler equation
in the presence of habit formation in consumption (α > 0), which states that
the growth of current consumption is positively related to a persistence effect
of lagged consumption cˆt−1, according to the coefficient α1+α , to the expected
increase in future consumption cˆet+1 (weakened with respect to the case of ab-
sence of any habit formation by the coefficient 11+α ) and negatively related to
the real interest rate (rt− pˆiet+1). In fact, a positive growth of this latter quantity
determines a decrease in private consumption in favor of saving.
9In order to reduce the equations in (1) we indicate real wages in a more compacted form
with w.
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Firms
The supply side of the economy is composed of a continuum of firms, indexed by
i ² [0; 1]; each firm produces a different variety of good with the same constant
returns to scale technology, i.e.
Yt (i) = AtNt (i) (25)
where Yt (i) is the production function of good i, Nt (i) is the amonunt of
labor employed in the productive process of good i and At is a productivity
shifter whose law of motion in logs reads as
at = ρat−1 + ²at (26)
where at = logAt, ρ² [0, 1] is the persistence coefficient of labor productivity
and ²at is a white noise.
Each firm has a probability of resetting price in any given period, 1 − θ,
independent across firms (staggered price setting, Calvo (1983)), with θ ² [0; 1],
indicating an index of price stickiness. Hence, the implied average price duration
is 11−θ .
Labor market clearing condition reads as
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt (i) di
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Yt (i)
At
di
Nt =
(
Yt
At
)∫ 1
0
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ε
di (27)
The first-order log-linearization of (27) is10
yt = at + nt (28)
The definition of real marginal costs (mct) reads as
mct = wt − pt − at (29)
The aggregate price dynamics reads as
Pt =
[
θ (Pt−1)
1−ε + (1− θ) (P ∗t )1−ε
] 1
1−ε
(30)
10The lowercase variables indicate the corresponding log-linear format. When the non linear
version of an equation contains only multiplicative terms the log-linearized equation, which
coincides with the log-deviation around the steady state, is not an approximation.
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with P ∗t indicating the prices resetted in period t.
The division of each member of (30) by Pt−1 reads as
Π1−εt = θ + (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt−1
)1−ε
(31)
The log-linearization of (31) around zero inflation steady state produces the
following equivalent results
pit = (1− θ) (p∗t − pt−1) (32)
pt = θpt−1 + (1− θ) p∗t (33)
A firm in period t chooses a price P ∗t that maximizes the current market
value of the profits Υt, i.e.
max
P∗t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+k
(
P ∗t Yt+k|t −Ψt+k
(
Yt+k|t
))}
(34)
subject to the sequence of demand constraints
Yt+k|t =
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−ε
Ct+k (35)
for k = 0, 1, 2, ... and where Qt,t+k = βk (Ct+k/Ct) (Pt/Pt+k) is the discount
factor, Ψt (·) is the cost function of the firm, whereas Yt+k|t represents output
in period t + k for a firm resetting its price in period t. Next, the first order
condition associated with the problem (34) is given by:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+kYt+k|t
(
P ∗t −Mψt+k|t
)}
= 0 (36)
where ψt+k|t = Ψ
′
t+k
(
Yt+k|t
)
indicates the nominal marginal cost in period
t+ k for a firm resetting its price in period t and M = εε−1 that is the desired
markup in the absence of constraints on the frequency of price adjustment. Note
that in the absence of price rigidities (θ = 0) the previous condition collapses to
the optimal price setting condition under flexible prices:
P ∗t =Mψt|t (37)
Then, the division of both the members of (36) by P it−1 reads as:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+kYt+k|t
(
P ∗t
Pt−1
−M ∗MCt+k|tΠt−1,t+k
)}
= 0 (38)
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where MCt+k|t =
ψt+k|t
Pt+k
is the real marginal cost in period t+k for firms whose
last price set is in period t.
Finally, the log-linearization of (38) around the zero inflation steady state
with a first-order Taylor expansion reads as
p∗t − pt−1 = (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et
[
m̂ct+k|t + (pt+k − pt−1)
]
(39)
where m̂ct+k|t = mct+k|t − mc is the log-deviation of marginal cost from its
steady state value.
The optimal price setting strategy for the typical firm resetting its price in
period t can be derived from (39), after some algebra:
p∗t = µ+ (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et
[
mct+k|t + pt+k
]
(40)
with µ = log εε−1 , that represents the optimal markup in the absence of
constraints on the frequency of price adjustment (θ = 0) . The level of output
associated to a fully-flexible price scenario is y¯t with the following corresponding
log-linear definition of output gap
y˜t = yt − y¯t (41)
Hence, the price setting rule for the firms resetting their prices is represented
by a charge over the optimal markup in the presence of fully flexible prices, given
by a weighted average of their current and expected nominal marginal costs,
with the weights being proportional to the probability of the price remaining
effective (θ)k.
Note that, under the hypothesis of costant returns to scale, implicit in the
production function of our model, the marginal cost is independent from the
level of production, i.e. mct+k|t = mct+k and, hence, common across firms; so,
the expression (40) can be rewritten in the following way:
p∗t − pt−1 = (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et [mct+k] +
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et [pt+k] (42)
Moreover, the equation (42) can be expressed in the following recursive form:
p∗t − pt−1 = βθEt
[
p∗t+1
]− (1− βθ) pt + (1− βθ) m̂ct (43)
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and combined with (32) in a log-linear form in order to obtain the domestic
inflation equation:
pit = βpiet+1 +
(1− θ) (1− βθ)
θ
m̂ct (44)
with piet+1 = Et [pit+1] .
The expression (44) states that the current value of domestic inflation is
positively related to the discounted expected value of the inflation of one period
ahead and to the log-deviation of real marginal cost according to the degree of
price stickiness captured by the parameter θ.
Government
Following the same structure of private consumption, public consumption is
given by
Gt =
(∫ 1
0
Gt (i)
ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
(45)
where Gt (i) represents the quantity of domestic good i purchased by the gov-
ernment
The Government chooses optimally the composition of a Dixit-Stiglitz aggre-
gator over all the variety of goods produced to minimize expenditure, yielding
a structure of demand schedules analogous to those of private consumption:
Gt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
Gt (46)
Moreover, the dynamics of the aggregate public consumption is assumed to
follow an AR(1) process (in logs):
gt = ϕgt−1 + ²
g
t (47)
where gt = logGt, ϕ² [0, 1] is the persistence coefficient of public expenditure
and ²gt is a white noise, assuming that government spending is entirely financed
by means of lump-sum taxes, i.e.
Gt = Tt (48)
Equilibrium Dynamics
The market clearing conditions for the good i can be expressed as follows:
Yt(i) = Ct(i) +Gt(i) (49)
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The previous relationship states that production of good i can be allocated
to private and public consumption.
Then, using the definitions of Ct(i) and Gt(i), equation (49) can be rewritten
as follows:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
(Ct +Gt) (50)
Finally, by plugging (50) into the definition of the aggregate output
[
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt (i)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
]
,
the aggregate market clearing condition is obtained:
Yt = Ct +Gt (51)
A first-order log-linearization of (51) around the steady state reads as
yˆt = λgˆt + (1− λ) cˆt (52)
where λ = G¯
Y¯
is the steady state government spending share on output.
Finally, the model is ”closed” with a monetary policy Taylor rule, according
to which the nominal interest rate positively reacts to the log-deviations output
gap
(̂˜yt) and inflation (pit):
rt = φpipit + φŷ˜yt (53)
Note that, since, following the literature (Gal`ı, 2003 and 2008), we assume
a zero inflation steady state, the log-linear measure of inflation gap, i.e. the
difference between the actual value of inflation and the one in the presence of
fully flexible prices, coincides with the log of inflation.
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